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~ Center for Naturalism Newsletter ~ September, 2010 |
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Contents
~ CFN News: icon/logo
contest; meetups and the meaning of naturalism; discussion and networking;
the CFN shifts gears; starting a philosophy cafe. ~ Briefly Noted: William S. Robinson's Your Brain and You; skeptical review of two books on naturalistic spirituality.
Icon & logo contest
When last counted there were 48 Meetup groups with over 7,500 members that list naturalism as a focus, most being atheist, freethinker, humanist or rationalist groups. Given that naturalism means different things to different folks, it isn’t surprising that naturalism is (or was) also claimed as a focus by such diverse groups as Arlington Tai Chi & Qi Gong Meetup, the Dublin Bindu Center Tantra Group, the Chester County Holistic Wellness Meetup Group, and The Raw Natural Path in Buckhorn, Ontario (“for those living or interested in a Raw Food lifestyle or simply those who love nature”). To disambiguate naturalism as a worldview, I recommend the simple phrase “naturalism as opposed to supernaturalism.” People will immediately get what you’re driving at and won’t confuse you with someone promoting tantra, whole foods, or holistic or undressed life styles. Not that those aren’t perfectly fine pursuits when kept consistent with science - admittedly a tall order in some cases.
Discussion and networking
If you're interested in discussing naturalism,
pro, con, or in between, consider joining us at the
Naturalism Philosophy Forum, open membership and no commitment to
naturalism required. Those fully on board about worldview naturalism
interested in promoting or applying it are welcome at the
Applied
Naturalism group (membership by application). If you enjoy social
networking, then the Facebook
naturalism
group or page
might appeal, and if you're interested in the spiritual/religious
possibilities of naturalism check out the
Religious
Naturalism group. Some naturalism-friendly blogs are hosted by
Ophelia Benson, Russell
Blackford,
J. Ash Bowie,
Richard Carrier,
Jerry Coyne,
Tanner Edis,
Exapologist,
Stephen Law,
Luke Muehlhauser,
Massimo Pigliucci,
Jason Rosenhouse, and
John Shook. Also, check out the
Inspiring Naturalism
podcast with Connie Barlow and Michael Dowd. To meet actual live fellow naturalists, then
Meetup (discussed above) is a
good bet, or get in touch with your local humanist, atheist or freethinker
group.
Although more can always be done to refine, organize and apply worldview naturalism, and although it will never go unchallenged, the basic elements are essentially in place, about which see here and here. After 7 years in (very non-profit) business, CFN will therefore concentrate more on outreach and networking to raise the visibility of naturalism, for instance via the icon/logo, videos, podcasts and/or radio, a revised edition of Encountering Naturalism and other publications, and by any other means or media - your suggestions welcome. If you're a naturalist with skills in any of these domains and would like to participate in memeing naturalism, don't hesitate to be in touch. We of course welcome and encourage donations - no other organization does what we do.
I've stepped down as moderator of the Philosophy Cafe at Harvard Book Stores (formerly the Davis Square Philosophy Cafe), transferring operations to a committee that will pick topics and moderators on a rotating basis. If you're interested in starting a cafe in your location, let me know since there's a good deal of material I can easily send your way: topic titles and descriptions, suggested readings, and moderator's notes. Note that worldview naturalism is not presupposed or advocated in most of the topics or readings.
Why the focus on free will at the Center for Naturalism?
A word of explanation is in order about why free will is so often the focus at CFN. It's simply because debates about free will centrally involve human nature and human agency, matters of considerable practical and existential importance. The naturalist doesn't suppose human beings, complex and multi-talented though they are, transcend causal laws and explanations in their behavior. The naturalist view is therefore directly at odds with the widespread culturally-transmitted assumption in the West that we possess supernatural souls or disembodied mental agents with contra-causal free will. Human beings are widely believed to be causally privileged over their surroundings, little first causes, little gods: each of us has the power to have done otherwise in the exact situation in which we didn't do otherwise. Since this assumption expresses itself in our concepts of blame, credit, responsibility, self-worth and deservingness, to challenge it has all sorts of ramifications, personal, social and political. To my knowledge, CFN is the only organization that is drawing out and publicizing the progressive, humanistic implications of the science-based denial of contra-causal free will. Until other organizations get involved, we remain the only non-profit group advocating no free will (NFW) enlightenment, of freedom from free will. Which explains our emphasis on it here and elsewhere at Naturalism.Org.
In his latest book, The Moral Landscape, Sam Harris devotes 10 pages (pp. 102-112) to debunking contra-causal free will and drawing out the progressive implications for our beliefs, attitudes and social practices. This is a most welcome development since Harris commands a wide readership and considerable respect (although by no means universal agreement) among atheists, humanists, skeptics and freethinkers. Such readers are among those most likely to be receptive to the thesis – radical from the traditional dualistic religious perspective, but a scientific commonplace – that we aren’t causal exceptions to nature... Continued here.
As the title suggests, Evatt's newly expanded book is an unabashedly partisan take on the free will debate that collects essays and quotes from those who strongly doubt that we are uncaused causers. The format is folksy, most of entries are short and non-technical, but the contributors are largely respected academics, psychologists, philosophers and scientists. As a result, Evatt demonstrates that her skepticism about (contra-causal) free will has plenty of informed support (but note that this book is definitely not for philosophers since it doesn't purport to present detailed, rigorous argumentation). Since most of those quoted haven't gone terribly public in denying free will - not a thesis to win you friends and admirers - Evatt has rendered a great service in making these thoughts available to a general, non-philosophical audience. Her running commentary along the way keeps things lively and down to earth. Even better, from the CFN perspective, she draws out the psychological and interpersonal benefits of seeing that we are fully embedded in a cause and effect world. The last chapter is an entertaining account of her own NFW (no free will) enlightenment, which seems to have made her more open, accepting and compassionate. Skeptics might say that the causality could run the other way, that liberals like Evatt gravitate towards a philosophy consistent with their predilections. But that's OK since in Evatt's case the philosophy - naturalism - has plenty of independent support coming from a scientific understanding of what sorts of creatures we really are. If you want to introduce someone to the practical and ethical advantages of questioning a central myth of Western culture, give them this book.
Writing for a special series of "inaugural articles" for the National Academy of Sciences, biologist Anthony R. Cashmore is refreshingly candid in denying we have libertarian or contra-causal free will. He argues at length that his fellow biologists have been too reticent in this regard: they should repudiate free will just as vehemently and publicly as they repudiate vitalism. Even better, he draws out the positive social consequences of questioning contra-causal agency... Continued here.
Knights Templeton on quest for causa sui
The existence of free will is perhaps only second to the existence of God as a concern among those who believe science threatens human meaning and values. Just as scientific explanations of the origins of human beings obviate the necessity of invoking a creator, so too scientific explanations of human behavior obviate the necessity of invoking some special human capacity for choice that transcends cause and effect. This is worrisome for those invested in the idea that to be dignified, moral, and effective agents, we must transcend natural laws in some respect... Continued here.
Freedom from free will - guest blog at NPR's 13.7 Cosmos and Culture
Naturalism as a positive worldview - at Conversations from the Pale Blue Dot, with Luke Muehlhauser, worldview naturalist and host of Common Sense Atheism.
Is scientific inquiry restricted to nature? - co-authored with Ursula Goodenough at NPR's 13.7 Cosmos and Culture
Close encounters of the 4th kind: metaphysical naturalism as an empirically plausible conjecture. If you stick with science in deciding what's factually the case, naturalism is the best bet about what exists. But naturalists should remain cognitively humble given the possibility of someday being proven wrong by their own standards of evidence.
Respecting privacy: why consciousness isn't even epiphenomenal. Consciousness, in particular phenomenal, qualitative experiences like pain, is not the sort of thing that can be seen, measured, weighed or otherwise observed from an external perspective. Consciousness is arguably a categorically private phenomenon, non-identical to its publicly observable correlates. I develop the idea that consciousness and its correlates inhabit two mutually non-interacting explanatory spaces, 1st person and 3rd person, respectively. Since well-formulated 3rd person explanations of behavior are restricted to public observables such as brains, bodies and environments, private experiences such as pain are barred from playing a role in such explanations. This constitutes a clean solution to the problem of mental causation: consciousness and its physical correlates don't causally interact since they are in different explanatory spaces. This means that consciousness isn't epiphenomenal with respect to observable behavior: a phenomenon can only be fairly described as epiphenomenal (causally inert or inefficacious) with respect to another if they inhabit the same explanatory space.
William S. Robinson's Your Brain and You
Philosopher William S. Robinson has just published Your Brain and You: What Neuroscience Means for Us. I haven't yet read it, but his description sounds intriguing:
Skeptical review of two books on naturalistic spirituality
Fatalism vs. determinism
William writes:
Hi William,
- Tom
Bruce writes:
Bruce,
Thanks, and you’re right that we could all do better in being precise about varieties of
naturalism, a specialty of
John Shook over at the Center for
Inquiry. Here’s my take: Metaphysical naturalism is simply the claim
that the natural world is all that exists; there’s nothing non-natural or
supernatural, however one defines it (a matter of debate of course, see
here for
instance). You could also call this ontological naturalism, since
it's a claim about what sorts of things exist - an ontology. Philosophical naturalism is the meta-philosophical stance
that philosophy and science are non-compartmentalized collaborators in
investigating reality, such that philosophy alone, done from the armchair
without looking at the world empirically, doesn’t get us very far. Many
philosophers these days are naturalists in this sense, although again
there’s lots of debate about the meaning and viability of philosophical
naturalism. See
here for a very good
podcast on this, and I recommend Jack Ritchie’s Understanding Naturalism,
reviewed
here and
here, and De Caro
and Macarthur's
Naturalism in Question.
2010 Darwin Day Party at Tommy Doyle's, Harvard Square, Cambridge, MA
Darwin cake, 600 dpi frosting! The proud winner of the Hopeful Monster Contest.
More pictures here, courtesy of Sarah Chandonnet, Harvard Humanist Chaplaincy
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For those interested in learning more about naturalism, or in participating in outreach, research, and writing in collaboration with the CFN, here are a few resources, online and otherwise.
Causality Consulting - practical philosophical consultation that's science-based, short-term, and results-driven. Encountering Naturalism: A Worldview and Its Uses - "the little orange book of naturalism" is in its second printing, available at Amazon. About the book, see
Naturalism: The Next Step for Humanists? - online video presentation about naturalism for the Freethought Association of Western Michigan; works as a spoken introduction to the philosophy and its implications. Applied Naturalism Group - a forum to explore the personal and social applications of naturalism; membership by application.
Naturalism Philosophy Forum - to facilitate the investigation of scientific naturalism, its assumptions, structure, and logical implications; open membership.
Religious Naturalism - an online group explores the spiritual implications of naturalism, see Religious Naturalism and its associated Yahoo group.
Psychological Self-Help - an excellent resource, see in particular two chapters on determinism applied to issues of self-acceptance and self-control.
Flickers of Freedom - a free will/moral agency blog with knowledgeable contributors on the leading edge of current academic debates, replaces the estimable Garden of Forking Paths.
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