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Free Will
"How
might we be changed by dwelling intensely on the view that ultimate responsibility is
impossible?" -
Galen Strawson, "Luck Swallows Everything," Times Literary Supplement,
June 26, 1998
The extent to which some of our most famous philosophical and political progenitors,
including Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, were skeptical about
contra-causal free will is not widely known.
This needs fixing.
A terrific debunking of
contra-causal free will that explores the humanistic implications of naturalism,
by attorney Robert Gulack, presented to the Ethical Culture Society of Bergen
County, NJ. Among other things, we discover that Abraham Lincoln and
Thomas Jefferson were skeptics about free will. Other good talks by Gulack
are
here
(on time) and
here
(on ethics).
Some think that by acknowledging our
causal connections to nature, naturalism threatens human freedom, power, dignity
and creativity. But that’s only if we suppose we have the logically impossible
freedom of being self-caused selves. Natural autonomy gives us everything we
might reasonably want as human agents.
A reply to David Hodgson's target
article "A plain person's free will" in the
Journal of Consciousness Studies,
V 12, #1.
Tamler Sommers of Duke University argues that Clarence Darrow
had it right: we aren't ultimately responsible for ourselves, and seeing that
can help free us from indignation,
outrage, resentment, and hatred.
An analysis of Paul Davies’ worry about free will in
which two types of freedom are described, one supernatural and one natural.
Only one, it turns out, is necessary for all we hold near and dear. And
the other is widely discounted by scientists and philosophers developing a
naturalistic view of ourselves.
A
selection of excerpts from news stories that refer to free will in various
contexts. They illustrate how the term is used, and how beliefs in free
will function as a background assumption in justifying attitudes and social
policies.
Philosopher Galen Strawson is interviewed by Tamler Sommers
on what it would mean to free ourselves from mistaken beliefs in ultimate
freedom and moral responsibility. Living with the truth that such
things don't exist, although perhaps difficult at first, might bring considerable
psychological and social benefits.
Sheldon Richman, of the Future of
Freedom Foundation, illustrates the sometimes panicked reaction to neuroscience
("the muck of reductionism") by those who suppose that without contra-causal,
ultimate freedom, all is lost. But on due consideration, there's no need
to panic.
On the last day of 2002, science
writer John Horgan wrote a piece on free will for the New York Times
science section, entitled
"More Than Good Intentions: Holding Fast to Faith in
Free Will." However, under pressure from research that challenges
the notion of a mental agent independent of deterministic neural processes,
Horgan admits that his faith in free will might be wavering. My
recommendation, of course, is that he lose this unnecessary faith altogether,
and get comfortable with the idea that our freedom and dignity don't require us
to be uncaused, non-physical, or otherwise mysterious agents.
Philosopher
Saul Smilansky thinks that belief in free will, which he concedes doesn't exist, is
necessary to provide essential support for morality, meaning, and the worth of human
beings. I argue that he is mistaken on all counts, and that we would be better off
morally and existentially without believing the falsehood that we have free will.
Moreover, Smilansky's view entails a massive, world-wide project of systematic deception
about our causal connection to nature, which is neither possible, necessary, nor
desirable. Free will is not a necessary fiction, and making known the naturalistic
truth about ourselves is a far better basis for human flourishing.
These writings by mainstream authors show that Naturalism.org is neither
unique nor crazy in suggesting that 1) we dont have free will and 2) wed
be better off if we made our peace with this fact and adjusted our beliefs and social
practices accordingly.
Some
fear that science, by revealing the causes of behavior, will undermine traditional
concepts of freedom and responsibility, leaving us with no moral recourse. Science
indeed undermines the traditional libertarian notion of free will, but there are viable
concepts of freedom and responsibility which are compatible with a scientific
understanding of ourselves. The compatibilist view of moral responsibility
underwrites moral judgments, but it also suggests we invest our energies in addressing the
causes of evil and criminality instead of imposing unnecessarily harsh punishments which
simply perpetuate the cycle of violence. Published in
Free Inquiry, Spring 2002.
1)
Unitarian Reverend Joel Miller provides a thoughtful essay in which he grapples with the
ominous implications of science for the sort of free will he supposes we must
have. But is it really the case, as he puts it, that "if free will is an
illusion, then this church and this nation exist for nothing?" To see why not,
click here.
2)
William R. Clark, co-author of
Are We
Hardwired? suggests that free will is a matter of indeterminacy or unpredictability
generated by chaotic processes in the brain. But how can such free will give us
moral responsibility if we ourselves can't predict what we'll do next? This
dialog explores a naturalistic
alternative to the rather dubious liberty that might be conferred by randomness.
Abstract.
This essay appeared in the Journal of
Consciousness Studies' special issue on free will, The Volitional Brain:
Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. As the title suggests, it is largely a
commentary on the issue's contents, with a partisan objective. It serves somewhat to
balance the influence of editor-neuroscientist Benjamin Libet, as well as some other
libertarian contributors, who are bent, it seems, on discovering contra-causal free will
somewhere in the brain. The libertarians and their evident fear of mechanism are a
good foil to showcase a humanistic determinism which has all the necessary resources, I
argue, to support our ethical intuitions and which might also soften punitive and
ego-driven attitudes that permeate our culture.
Abstract.
This tries to take the curse off "creeping mechanism" by showing that
nothing vital depends on our being independent of natural cause and effect. Some
equate determinism with genetic determinism, but this ignores the fact that environmental
factors contribute equally to shaping human characteristics. An earlier version of
this essay appeared in an issue of the Philosopher's
Magazine with a special forum on free will, entitled "Human Machines?".
What would it be like to conceive of ourselves and our moral
systems as completely contained within the natural realm, the contingent products of
Darwinian evolutionary processes? Is it possible to accept our status as complex animals,
deterministically connected to the rest of nature, and still take seriously our ethical
commitments? If we dont have free will, and the individual is not seen as ultimately
morally responsible for his or her actions, how do we carry on moral discourse and justify
moral judgments. Bruce Waller takes on these important questions in this eminently
readable and for the most part persuasive account of a naturalistic, non-objectivist
morality.
Abstract. The late Corliss Lamont, one of the
grand old men of American humanism, is taken to task for supposing that human beings are
exempt from naturalistic causality. His arguments for free will are rebutted, and
reasons are given for why we don't need even the illusion of free will in order to have
what we value. Several other present day philosophers, scientists, and writers are
quoted on the free will problem. This paper provides an overview of the naturalistic
attack on free will, since it examines (albeit briefly) several standard arguments and
several of the psychological difficulties encountered when giving up the human exemption
from causality. This paper originally appeared in the Humanist.
Abstract. This focuses on free will, responsibility and
punishment from a naturalistic perspective, using the example of Susan Smith, who was
found guilty of drowning her two children in a South Carolina lake. A central point
is that plausible explanations of a crime rule out the existence of a freely willing agent
that could have done otherwise in a given situation. This means that retributive
justifications for punishment can't find a footing in free will, therefore the retaliatory
motive for the death penalty is likely to diminish. Nevertheless, a full causal
explanation of Susan Smith's act does not constitute an "abuse excuse", since we
must enforce sanctions to ensure a civil, safe society. This paper originally
appeared as a cover story for the Humanist and has been reprinted in
The
Critical Reader, Thinker, and Writer, Mayfield Publishing, 1997.
Abstract. This takes a broader view of the seeming threat
of naturalistic materialism to morality, using some passages from MIT cognitive scientist
Stephen Pinker's How the Mind Works as a target. Pinker, like his colleague
Marvin Minsky, supposes that we must "idealize" ourselves as uncaused creatures
in order to have morality. That is, he thinks we must pretend to have free will,
even though science shows we don't. Naturally, and naturalistically, I take issue
with this and try to show that we need not compartmentalize science and ethics. I
suggest that this is not merely an academic issue, but has real world consequences for how
we approach social deviance and destructive behavior.
These
are three brief sallies against the plausibility of fatalism, one by Bob Miller of
Charlottesville. They are designed to prevent any plunge into pessimism that
determinism might engender among those who suppose we must have free will for life to be
worth living. Fatalism is pretty obviously false, but we want to make sure no one
gets demoralized by a naturalism that understands all our behavior as fully a function of
environment and heredity. It's important (and not difficult) to avoid the false
conclusion that determinism disempowers us. It doesn't in the least; rather it shows
us how to make the most of our abilities. If after reading these, you find yourself
depressed about not having free will, please be in
touch.
This
reading is Galen Strawson's contribution on free will to the
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which
was reprinted in the Times Literary Supplement,
June 26, 1998 under the title "Luck Swallows Everything." He provides a
concise, not too technical, and (to my mind) persuasive overview of the issues on free
will, coming to the conclusion that the facts simply do not support our sense of being the
radically autonomous, originative cause of our actions.
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